Moving off the farm: Land institutions to facilitate structural transformation and agricultural productivity growth in China by Deininger, Klaus et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5949
Moving off the Farm
Land Institutions to Facilitate Structural Transformation 
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Agriculture has made major contributions to China’s 
economic growth and poverty reduction, but the 
literature has rarely focused on the institutional factors 
that might underpin such structural transformation 
and productivity. This paper aims to fill that gap. 
Drawing on an 8-year panel of 1,200 households in 
six key provinces, it explores the impact of government 
land reallocations and formal land-use certificates on 
agricultural productivity growth, as well as the likelihood 
of households to exit from agriculture or send family 
members to the non-farm sector. It finds that land 
This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a 
larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at kdeininger@worldbank.org.  
tenure insecurity, measured by the history of past land 
reallocations, discourages households from quitting 
agriculture. The recognition of land rights through formal 
certificates encourages the temporary migration of rural 
labor. Both factors have a large impact on productivity 
(at about 30 percent each), mainly by encouraging 
market-based land transfers. A sustained increase in 
non-agricultural opportunities will likely reinforce the 
importance of secure land tenure, which is a precondition 
for successful structural transformation and continued 
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1. Introduction 
Agriculture has made enormous contributions to poverty reduction and overall development in China. 
However, in the presence of other impediments to the free movement of factors, growth of economic 
opportunities  and  demand  for  labor  in  the  non-agricultural  sector  has  given  rise  to  significant  inter-
sectoral  and  inter-regional  income  disparities  that  have  become  of  concern  to  policy-makers.  The 
magnitudes involved can be appreciated by noting that, while agriculture‟s contribution to the economy 
declined from 40% in 1970 to less than 10% now, the share of labor employed in the sector in 2005, 
though down from 81% in 1970, still stood at 45%. This raises the question whether China can release 
labor from agriculture in a way that enhances productivity and brings about gradual increases in farm size 
and  adoption  of  mechanized  labor-saving  methods  of  cultivation  rather  than  relying  on  potentially 
distorting subsidies and at a pace that is fast enough to prevent further rapid widening of the gap between 
rural and urban incomes.  
Institutional arrangements for the functioning of land and labor markets are a determinant of the ease with 
which this objective can be achieved. It is well known that restrictions on migrants‟ ability to gain urban 
residency permits (hukou) may impede migration so that returns to labor received by farmers remain well 
below the wages they could earn outside of agriculture. Land tenure arrangements are relevant in two 
respects. On the one hand, households who might be better off moving out of agriculture might fail to do 
so because of fear that, with continued threats of land reallocation without fair compensation at market 
value, leaving the land would imply a significant risk of losing rights to their land. On the other hand, in 
the absence of land certificates, the transaction cost associated with transferring land to those who can 
make more productive use of it may be too high, preventing many efficiency-enhancing transactions.  
While policy makers are aware of these issues and  have tried to address them through a number of 
measures, including the 2003 rural land contracting law (RLCL), evidence on the effectiveness of these 
provisions remains limited. Understanding of whether they had the desired impact and the magnitude of 
any effects  on shifting labor out of agriculture  to bring about rural structural transformation  will be 
important  in  light  of  a  number  of  recent  concerns.  These  include,  in  addition  to  rising  rural-urban 
inequality, the challenges posed by a gradual exhaustion of the pool of cheap labor in the country‟s 
interior, an aging rural population, and a need for continued agricultural productivity growth to overcome 
land and water scarcity.  
To  explore  the  impact  of  land-related  institutions  on  temporary  or  permanent  labor  movements  (via 
migration or off-farm employment) out of agriculture, we use a panel data set covering a period of almost 
10 years (2000-2008). Methodologically, this allows us to use panel estimators to control for unobserved   3 
time-invariant household characteristics which, if there are no structural differences between treated and 
control groups, can be interpreted as causal effects. Substantively, our data cover a period characterized 
by far-reaching economic and institutional changes in terms of off-farm labor market participation and 
agricultural productivity changes; real output per mu more than doubled from Y 2,550 to Y 5,588, despite 
declining staple crop prices. Some 15% of sample households exited agriculture and the mean share of 
household labor supplied to the non-agricultural sector increased from less than 50% to more than 60%.  
Tenure insecurity, as measured by recent land reallocations, and transferability of land, as proxied by the 
share of households with certificates in a village, affect non-agricultural labor supply. Having experienced 
land reallocation discourages exit from agriculture but has no impact on labor supply to migration or the 
local non-farm sector. Coverage with land certificates, a variable rarely considered in past literature, is 
estimated to have potentially large effects on migration but not local off-farm work; compared to a village 
with no land documents, the average household in a village fully covered with certificates is estimated to 
supply  about  half  a  person-year  more  to  non-farm  labor  markets  via  migration.  Security  against 
reallocation and the ease of transferring land are likely to play an important role as determinants of 
China‟s ability to transform its rural sector and improve allocative efficiency.  
To the extent that they affect households‟ labor supply, we would expect these arrangements to also have 
an impact on agricultural productivity. Significant and quantitatively large productivity-effects are indeed 
confirmed by the data. Having been affected by reallocation after 2000 is estimated to reduce productivity 
by some 30% whereas possession of a land certificate in either period increases productivity by between 
30% and 32%. These effects are not only quantitatively large but, in both cases, appear to be driven more 
by allocative efficiency than by investment-effects. As exogenous factors are likely to further increase the 
need and scope for efficiency-enhancing land transfers in the future, institutional measures to reduce the 
threat  of  land  reallocation  and  increase  coverage  with  certificates  thus  appear  to  have  considerable 
potential to help China transform its rural sector and realize efficiency gains that could increase overall 
rural welfare and narrow or at least prevent widening of rural-urban income gaps.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two provides context by reviewing the role of agriculture in 
China‟s long-term development, recent institutional challenges in this respect, and legal initiatives taken 
to deal with them. Section three discusses the data used in more detail, reporting descriptive statistics on 
movement out of agriculture as well as agricultural productivity, in addition to introducing the conceptual 
framework  for  subsequent  analysis.  Section four  presents  econometric  results  to  quantify  impacts  of 
institutional arrangements on partial or full movement out of agriculture and agricultural productivity. 
Section five concludes by drawing out implications for policy and possible future research.  
     4 
2. Background and context  
While  agricultural  growth  in  China  has  made  unprecedented  contributions  to  poverty  reduction, 
institutional  factors  also  pose  enormous  challenges  to  the  smooth  movement  of  labor  out  of  the 
agricultural sector into higher-paying non-agricultural pursuits and to market-based land transfers to more 
productive farmers who can then expand the scale of their operations. Such transfers will become more 
important to prevent or limit widening of rural-urban income gaps in light of the challenges posed by 
rapid ageing of the rural population, a tighter overall labor supply, and environmental issues arising from 
scarcity of land and water resources. We review evidence of how reallocations and lack of documented 
property  rights  have  in  the  past  limited  investment  and  farmers‟  movement  out  of  agriculture,  the 
legislative measures taken to address this, and ways in which institutional changes could affect outcome 
variables included in our data.  
2.1 Agriculture in China’s economic development: Past contributions and future challenges  
Growth  of  the  rural  economy,  driven  by  agriculture,  and  distributed  equally  as  a  consequence  of 
egalitarian access to land, has been a key reason for rapid poverty reduction in China. In 1981, China was 
sixth-poorest country in the world,
1 with a poverty headcount of 84%. Growth in the primary sector, i.e. 
mainly in agriculture was four times  more effective in reducing poverty than  growth in secondary or 
tertiary sectors (Ravallion and Chen 2007); it helped to reduce the poverty headcount to  16% by 2005, 
well below the developing world average of 26% (Ravallion 2009). 
While improved technology created the preconditions for  rural growth, institutional changes that made 
property rights more secure and transferable, thereby facilitating a shift of labor out of agriculture, were 
key factors facilitating this transition. After an eventful history,
 2 the first step was the 1978 Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) that made households residual claimants to output by contracting land from 
collectives  to  cultivators,  initially  for  a  period  of  15  years.  It  set  off  unprecedented  increases  in 
productivity  (Lin  1992,  McMillan  et  al.  1989).  However,  the  long-term  effect  was  limited  as  many 
contracts  remained  verbal  and  failed  to  provide  protection  against  administrative  land  reallocations 
(Rozelle et al. 2002). Land transfers were often still administered by village leaders in discretionary ways 
(Kung and Liu 1997),
3 creating conflicts of interest (Benjamin and Brandt 2002) and failing to capitalize 
on transfer opportunities created by rapid non-agricultural development. Agriculture was characterized by 
                                                           
1 Only Cambodia, Burkina Faso, Mali and Uganda had, in 1981, a higher headcount index than China (Ravallion 2009). 
2 Before the revolution, most farmers were poo r tenants or owners of small plots. The communist government confiscated large landlords‟ 
holdings and distributed land rights to households on an egalitarian basis (Prosterman et al. 1990). In the 1950s, collectivization was adopted, 
with disastrous consequences for output and rural welfare (Lin and Yang 2000, Putterman and Skillman 1993, Yao 1999). 
3 Exchanges of land within the village had been prohibited before the 1986 Land  Management Law legalized them. Transfers to outsiders 
remained illegal until allowed in 1998, although without clarifying specific modalities to be followed (Li 2003).   5 
enormous improvements in total factor productivity (Jin et al. 2010) that relate to different phases of 
policy reform (Brummer et al. 2006).  
Concentration of industry and rapid economic growth in the country‟s coastal region provided incentives for 
migration and temporary movement out of agriculture (Zhao 1999). As they responded to employment 
prospects and income differences (Lin et al. 2004), migrants contributed to rising rural incomes and well-
being and success of coastal export industries (Liu et al. 1998, Zhai and Wang 2002).
4 The magnitudes 
are immense: The  2000 census counted 124.6 million internal migrants  (Liang and Ma 2004) or about 
17% of the labor force (Taylor et al. 2003), up from less than 5% in 1988 and some 10% in 1995 (Rozelle 
et al. 1999). Restrictions on migrants‟ ability to gain residency at the destination imply that virtually all 
migration is temporary (Fleisher and Yang 2003), prevent equalization of income levels (Whalley and 
Zhang 2007), and contribute to persistent cross-regional imbalances (Au and Henderson 2006).  
At the household level, the difficulty of getting a residence permit and the implied high risk of moving 
out of agriculture and abandoning land use in favor of off-farm ventures is a key reason why returns to 
agricultural labor remain persistently below what can be obtained from non-agricultural work or self-
employment (Cook 1999). It contributed to factor market imperfections (Wang et al. 2007), made in 
many situations  decisions on  consumption and production non-separable (Bowlus and Sicular 2003), 
limited income diversification, and led to continued use of land as a key safety net and source of old-age 
support with few substitutes (Zhang 2010). While high incidence of migration by the poor (de Brauw et 
al. 2002) could in principle reduce poverty in sending communities (Zhao 2002), actual impacts are less 
clear (Du et al. 2005). Still, similar to other countries‟ experience, migration is often complemented by 
local off-farm employment and part-time farming (Brosig et al. 2009) or complete exit from agriculture.  
To develop institutional arrangements that can help improve functioning of factor markets, especially 
those for land, the government conducted a range of land tenure experiments (Kung 2006), building on 
the results to put in place legal measures to strengthen tenure security. Key among these are the 1998 
Land Management Law (Chen and Davis 1998) and then the 2003 Rural Land Contracting Law. The 
latter puts focus on three areas, namely (i) a more stringent definition of land rights as property rights 
rather than just private contracts; (ii) a ban on big reallocations and setting of clear conditions for small 
readjustments;
5 and (iii) a commitment to issuance of land documents.  However, while studies have 
explored determinants and impacts of land takings and the amount of compensation paid  (Deininger and 
                                                           
4 As interregional linkages and spillovers from the export- and foreign investment-driven boom in coastal areas remain limited  (Fu 2004), 
migration is the only opportunity for many rural residents to benefit from the country‟s economic boom. 
5 In the course of “big” reallocation, all farmland in the village was given back to the collective and, after subtracting proportional shares for land 
needed for other purposes, reallocated in equal sizes among villagers. “Small” readjustments, by contrast, merely transfer land from households 
who experienced changes in family composition but left the rest unaffected. The RLCL completely bans big reallocations while more clearly 
defining „small‟ readjustment and requires that it be approved by two thirds of the village.    6 
Jin 2008), the effect of institutional arrangements on labor supply has not been explored in depth. Study 
of this issue will be critical not only because of its direct bearing on rural-urban inequality but also as 
exogenous factors that create opportunities for factor markets to enhance allocative efficiency are likely to 
become more pronounced in the near future. For example, China may be entering a period of labor 
shortage (Cai and Wang 2010) where near-unlimited supply of cheap migrant labor from the country‟s 
interior can no longer be taken for granted (Zhang et al. 2010). Other countries‟ experience suggests that 
the institutional arrangements to promote structural change may persist and have long-term consequences, 
reinforcing the importance of carefully studying this issue.
6 
2.2 The role of land institutions in fostering structural transformation and off-farm development 
The literature holds that secure property rights to land can facilitate structural transformation in two ways 
(Besley and Ghatak 2010). Increased tenure security and the associated reduction of expropriation risk 
will increase investment incentives. Formal documentation of rights, e.g. through certificates, makes it 
easier to unambiguously identify legitimate owners and thereby reduces the transaction cost of market-
based land transfers. If other conditions -such as differences in productivity between producers because of 
availability of other sources of employment or a sufficiently liquid land sales market- are in place, this 
can  facilitate  either  efficiency-enhancing  land  transfers  to  more  productive  users  or  use  of  land  as 
collateral in credit markets (Deininger and Feder 2009). Adapting these principles to Chinese conditions, 
where use of rural land as collateral is not permitted, reallocations could threaten those moving out of 
agriculture, and coverage with certificates is uneven, allows us to derive testable hypotheses.  
Regarding land reallocation, in China the risk of dispossession for a resident cultivator who uses the land 
for agricultural purposes is low. This is one of the reasons why many studies find higher tenure security, 
defined as reduced probability of administrative reallocation, to have limited investment impact (Jacoby 
et al. 2002, Li et al. 1998). At the same time, the danger that renting out of land by somebody exiting 
agriculture could be perceived as a signal that the land is no longer required and could be transferred by 
administrative reallocation has long been identified as a potential challenge (Brandt et al. 2004, Yang 
1997). Reallocation may thus discourage exit from the sector at the margin, consistent with findings that, 
where  factor  markets  function  reasonably  well,  such  intervention  significantly  reduces  technical 
efficiency (Zhang et al. 2011). 
Regarding transferability, measures to facilitate market-based land transfers, e.g. by increasing coverage 
with land certificates and outlawing reallocation have a potential to make a very positive contribution to 
the economy (Carter and Yao 2002). Indeed, China witnessed rapid emergence of land rental markets which 
                                                           
6 Data spanning several decades up to a century from the US show that (i) there is a close correspondence between the non-agricultural wage rate 
and average farm size as a determinant of the potential income that can be achieved from agriculture (Gardner 2002); and (ii) exist from the 
agricultural sector is affected by expected returns to agricultural cultivation (Barkley 1990).    7 
had hardly existed as late as by the mid-1990s (Deininger and Jin 2005). In a situation where land loss by 
cultivators is unlikely and use of rural land as collateral not allowed, certificates or transferability could 
affect outcomes through two channels. A first one is to make contract enforcement easier, thus facilitating 
land transactions with individuals who are not close kin so that use of informal mechanisms for contract 
enforcement is not an option. A second one is to reduce the fear of land loss even if land is transferred for 
longer periods, thus allowing use of long-term contracts that can make a more substantive contribution to 
structural transformation, e.g. by allowing tenants to make long-term plans and investment.
7 Both of these 
can allow land users who might temporarily or permanently move out of the sector to earn higher and less 
risky returns from their land, thereby facilitating operation of factor markets and, if some of the proceeds 
are invested locally, creating the basis for a more vibrant rural economy.  
A number of recent studies provide partial empirical support for these arguments. In a 2006 representative 
sample, land rental facilitated a major shift from agriculture towards migration (from 57% to 17%). On 
rented plots, net revenue was some 60% higher than what the landlord been obtained by under self-
cultivation, and proceeds made landlords and tenants better off (Jin and Deininger 2009). A productivity-
enhancing role of land markets is also inferred from the fact that, in a more limited sample from Southern 
China, productivity on leased plots is consistently highest (Feng et al. 2010). For agricultural land, rental 
rights together with higher tenure security have been found to increase the probability of migration while 
higher levels of tenure security alone may reduce migration levels on agricultural land but increase it on 
forest land where differences in labor-land complementarities are less pronounced (Mullan et al. 2011).
8 
While this points towards positive impacts of factor market operation,  there is evidence that, even after 
reforms, institutional barriers to achieving fully efficient outcomes remain. Household perceptions and 
observed behavior -such as a priori limitation of the set of possible transaction partners- point towards 
remaining barriers to land market operation (Jin and Deininger 2009). Those predicted to be constrained 
in the off-farm labor market benefit more from exogenous increases in labor demand brought about by the 
sloping land conversion program, a key intervention increasing labor demand (Groom et al. 2010).  
A key question is thus whether, even with current restrictions on migration, remaining imperfections in 
rental markets impose constraints on farmers‟ ability to supply labor to the non-agricultural economy. As 
evidence on this is scant and public opinion on the merits of key institutional arrangements, e.g. the ban 
on land reallocation, continues to be strongly polarized (Wang et al. 2011). To be credible and policy 
relevant, such analysis of the impact of land institutions will have to avoid pitfalls such as (i) mistakenly 
                                                           
7 Of course, easier transferability will allow benefitting from an investment even if the land is no longer used. This may be the reason why some 
studies find that investment made in and/or after 1998, was 9.8% higher for households that have land use certificates (Zhu and Riedinger 2011). 
8 Higher tenure security alone, without a commensurate increase in transfer rights, reduces the probability of migration whereas increasing both 
rental rights and tenure security makes migration more likely but an increase in tenure security alone. The opposite is true  for forest land where 
the differences in labor land complementarities are less pronounced.   8 
interpreting inter-regional variation as a causal effect as may be the case with simple cross sectional 
analysis; (ii) neglecting exit from agriculture by restricting the sample to agricultural producers present in 
both periods; and (iii) looking at migration behavior without drawing out productivity implications.  
3. Data and descriptive evidence  
Descriptive data on changes in overall income levels and sources, occupational status, and agricultural 
productivity from our 6-province panel  highlight the  dynamic nature of China‟s rural sector and the 
geographically  differentiated  pattern  of  productivity  and  income  growth  as  well  as  occupational 
diversification. They provide the basis for a discussion of the empirical strategy exploring determinants of 
part-time and full time movement out of agriculture as well as agricultural productivity.  
3.1 Sample composition and key definitions  
Our data are from a two-period household survey conducted in China‟s six major agricultural provinces in 
2000 and 2008.
9 In each province, counties are stratified into five sub-groups by gross value of industrial 
output to represent varying income levels . Per province,  one county  and two villages  were randomly 
selected from each sub-group and 20 households interviewed in each selected village. This yields a total 
sample (in 2000) of 1200 households (6 provinces x 5 counties x 2 villages x 20 households). In 2008, 
two earthquake-damaged villages in Sichuan  could not be interviewed , reducing the sample to 1160 
households. Of these, 88 had moved to urban areas (of which 74 could be traced) while  53 dropped out 
and were replaced, leaving us with 1093  households for which information in 2000 as well as 2008 is 
available.
10  The household survey  includes  detailed information on agricultural outp uts and inputs, 
endowments with key factors of  production, off-farm activities, whether or not and when households 
received land use certificates, and whether or not and when households experienced land reallocations. 
We categorize households into non-, full-time-, or part time-farmers. Non-farmers are those who report 
neither agricultural output nor using any inputs for agricultural activity. Part time-farmers have at least 
one individual whose main activity is not farming but who instead  works outside the home county as a 
migrant or in local off-farm activities within the home county. In addition to the number of days spent in 
farming, the survey also includes information on the number of labor days supplied to the non-farm sector 
by migrants or those engaging in  local off-farm activity.
11 Overall economic development during the 
period is evidenced by considerable  shifts in occupational status; in 2000, 21% of the 1093 sample d 
households engaged in farming only, 73% were part -time farmers, and 6 % relied only on off -farm 
                                                           
9 Note that the second round of the survey was undertaken when the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis was most acute. If, as the literature 
suggests, the agricultural sector provided an employment buffer during the crisis, this will have to be factored in when interpreting results. 
10 Excluding earthquake-damaged households, attrition, including replacements, is thus 5.78% (53 replaced +14 untraceable /1160 households). 
11 Although this variable could, in principle, measure the extent of off -farm participation at the household level better than just the number of 
individuals, this variable is likely to be measured with high levels of error for migrants where information was  not provided by the concerned 
person directly. We therefore choose the number of individuals participating in off-farm markets as our main measure but report both.    9 
occupations. In the meantime, 5% more part-time farmers became non-farmers than full-time farmers, and 
64% of the full-time farmers either devoted some labor (52%) or all labor (12%) to off-farm employment.  
By 2008, the share of non-farmers (19%) had marginally eclipsed that of full-time farmers (17%) and the 
share of part-time farmers was reduced from 73% to 64% (table 1). This very aggregate picture show 
significant  variation  across  provinces  with  the  biggest increase  in  off-farm  households  (non-farmers) 
observed for Zhejiang (from 10% to 34%), followed by Hubei (7% to 21%) and Hebei (6% to 16%). Even 
in Liaoning, some 11% of the sample engaged in off-farm activities by 2008. In Hebei, Liaoning and 
Hubei, both full-time and part-time farmers abandoned agricultural production, leading to increases in the 
share of non-farmers from 6.0%, 3.2% and 7.3% to 16.0%, 10.8 and 20.9% respectively. In Shaanxi, the 
share of full-time farmers remained constant at 17% and all of the increase in the share of non-farmers 
(from 2.7% to 12.4%) came through a shift out of part-time farming. In Zhejiang, more than one third of 
previously rural households have shifted out of farming completely while the share of part-time farmers 
has remained more or less constant. Differences across types in terms of demographics, labor supply and 
its distribution, and aggregate agricultural productivity, provide interesting insights.  
In  addition  to  the  types  of  data  routinely  included  in  multi-purpose  household  surveys  and  detailed 
information on agricultural production, our data also provides evidence on institutional arrangements that 
affect land tenure security, in particular the coverage with certificates and levels of land reallocations of 
different types (large and small) at different points in time.
12 Assets include agricultural equipment, fixed 
business equipment, durable goods and residential structures.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics  
While there is a universal decrease in household size, the variable dropped most markedly for full time 
farmers, from 3.55 to 2.75 persons, along with an increase in the dependency ratio from 36% in 2000 -an 
already very high level- to 50%, compared to some 20% for the rest of the sample, in 2008. In line with 
this, income for this group was, with Y 6,223 in 2008, much lower than income by part-time (Y 21,845) 
and non-farmers (Y 22,737) during the period.
13 Education levels increased to 10.5 years and 10.2 years 
in 2008 for part -time and non-farmers, respectively, but only 7.3 years for full -time farmers. While 
income increased more than 60% in real terms between 2000 and 2008, inequality in per capita income 
narrowed slightly, with the Gini decreasing from 0.53 to 0.50, possibly due to a marked increase in 
subsidies (Huang et al. 2011). Gaps in asset levels were more pronounced and with the Gini for total asset 
                                                           
12 There are two caveats worth noting. First, a total of 129 households reported to have a certificate without being able to recall the exact time 
when it was received. All of the regressions below are based on the assumption that this group received documents before 2000 although results 
are robust to various alternative assumptions or dropping this group altogether. Second, as households who exited agricultural production did not 
report whether or not they had land certificates, we are forced to use village averages for the share of households with certificates instead.  
13 Note that, possibly a result of subsidies having increased significantly over the period, the rate of income growth experienced by full -time 
farmers was slightly higher than that for non- or part-time farmers.    10 
endowments rising from 0.64 to 0.72 between 2000 and 2008, asset inequality increased markedly: While 
full-time farmers increased their asset endowment from Y 16,863 to Y 53,445, part-time farmers did so 
from Y 33,432 to Y 84,355 and non-farmers from Y 75,880 to Y 226,816.  
Differences in demographic structure gave rise to marked variations in labor supply and sources and 
income levels across household types. Part time farmers increased labor supply from 578 to 738 days in 
total (or 182 to 241 days per adult), compared to an increase from 413 to 545 days (168 to 205 days per 
person) for non-farm and a change from 288 to 273 (125 to 158 days per person) for full-time farmers. 
With the exception of full-time farmers, the composition of labor supply changed markedly as well; 
although their total number of labor days in agriculture increased slightly (from 240 to 262), part time 
farmers reduced the share of time spent on agriculture from 41% to 36%, while expanding labor in 
migration from 21% to 31% and reducing local off-farm work from 38% to 33%. Non-farm households 
expanded supply of labor to migration from 23% to 60% while reducing labor in local off-farm activity 
from 78% to 40%. Shifts in labor supply are mirrored by corresponding changes of income composition.  
The data also point towards improved functioning of factor markets, especially those for land. While the 
amount of owned land decreased 9.1 mu to 6.9 mu for full-time and from 7.7 mu to 7.0 mu for part time 
farmers, cultivated land area decreased much less (from 9.7 mu to 8.8 mu) for full-time farmers and 
increased (from 8.2 mu to 8.9) for part time farmers, presumably as a result of better functioning of land 
rental markets. At the same time, land ownership by non-farmers increased, from 3 to 4.35 mu. The most 
likely reason is that the 2003 RLCL policy of stopping land redistribution was more strictly adhered to. 
More importantly, and in contrast to what would be expected in environments with missing markets 
where land reallocation might be the only mechanism to restore balance, our data suggest that having had 
a high level of land reallocation in the past will increase the expectation of future redistributions.  A 
review of institutional variables, in particular the incidence of land reallocations and land certificates by 
province, can provide insights on this (table 2).
14 Two findings emerge. First, land reallocation overall  
was infrequent; 70% of producers were never affected by such an event. Second, while the rate of 
reallocations decreased from 17% to 10%, marked differences emerge across provinces; while Hebei 
shows the most marked drop from 23% to 2% and redistributions more or less halved in Shaanxi (18% to 
8%) and Zhejiang (21% to 14%), they decreased less or stay constant in others, such as Hubei (15% to 
11%), Sichuan (8% to 7%), and Liaoning (15%).
15 Details on the type of reallocation are available only 
                                                           
14 The share of households with land use certificates must be undervalued as 129 households did not report the exact years when the certificates 
were issued, in which sense we only know they had certificates in year 2008 but we have no idea whether they had or not in year 2000. If these 
households were assumed to have received certificates in year 2000, the percentage would be 52% in total, 67% in Hebei, 53% in Shaanxi, 51% 
in Liaoning, 61% in Zhejiang, 53% in Sichuan, and 27% in Hubei. 
15 This is consistent with evidence of high levels of continued reallocation in many provinces that seems to be rooted in a continued gap between 
equity and efficiency with the policy of no redistribution (or full compensation for land taken from migrants) being supported by more educated, 
male-headed, and agriculture-dependent households (Wang et al. 2011).   11 
from village-level data which confirm a consistent trend towards reducing the number of reallocations 
across provinces. Between 2000 and 2008, no reallocations were carried out in Sichuan and Hebei and 
Zhejiang eliminated minor reallocations. In Hubei numbers are trivial (both 0.09) despite the existence of 
major and minor reallocations. On the other hand, while major reallocations were more limited in Shaanxi 
(0.29) and Liaoning (0.11), the share of minor reallocations increased. To interpret these figures recall 
that many villages did have a reallocation around 1998 in the context of renewal of land use contracts that 
had expired after the first 15-year period following the HRS.  
Table 2 illustrates that, although one third of households still lack a land use certificate, issuance of 
certificates has progressed more uniformly, in contrast to variable levels of compliance with policies to 
stop land reallocations. Between 32 and 52% of households had certificates before 2000 and lagging 
provinces, in particular Hubei and Liaoning where levels of issuance in 2000 had been remained very low 
caught up rapidly by providing certificates to 39% and 19% of producers, respectively, after 2000. To the 
extent that having certificates enhances transferability more than tenure security, we would expect it to 
facilitate out-migration and operation of land rental markets.  
In line with aggregate data, descriptive statistics in table 3 point towards large increases in real output per 
area and profit (including returns to family labor) over the period. The fact that cultivated area remained 
almost constant despite a decline in owned area to 83% of the 2000 value points towards increased rental 
market activity. Profit per mu increased by a factor of 2.3 and labor and capital intensity, defined as the 
amount of agricultural assets per mu, increased by 13% and 85%, respectively. Resource endowments 
varied widely across regions. In 2008, average owned and cultivated are 10 and 15 mu, respectively, in 
Liaoning as compared to 4 and 7 mu in Zhejiang. Relative factor intensities varied as expected, with labor 
intensity higher in land-scarce provinces such as Sichuan (82 days/mu in 2000 and 114 days/mu in 2008) 
compared  to  „land  abundant‟  ones  such  as  Liaoning  (24  and  32  days/mu,  respectively)  although 
alternative employment opportunities also appear to play a role, as illustrated by the decrease of labor 
intensity (from 32 to 28 days/mu) in Zhejiang. The total amount of agricultural assets, which increased by 
70% overall, more than doubled in Shaanxi while declining slightly in Zhejiang. The data also indicate 
considerable increase in major purchased inputs of crop production. Expenditure on fertilizer and other 
inputs (including pesticides, machinery, fuel and electricity) almost doubled over the eight year period 
(from 70 to 143 Yuan per mu for fertilizer and from 70 to 120 for other inputs) while spending on seeds 
increased by more than 50% (from 21 to 33 Yuan per mu), with regional variations. In Hebei, Shaanxi, 
Sichuan and Hubei values of these inputs in 2008 were more than 1.5 times of the values in 2000, the 
increases were less than 50% for all inputs in Zhejiang and for seeds and others in Liaoning.  
3.3 Conceptual framework and estimation strategy   12 
Our empirical analysis focuses on determinants of households‟ moving off the farm and of agricultural 
productivity. To identify determinants of the first set of outcomes, we use a reduced form equation  
                                              (1) 
where     represents either (i) an indicator variable that is one if the household derives all its income from 
non-farm activities and zero otherwise; (ii) the number of individuals in the household who derive their 
main income from off-farm activities; or (iii) the number of labor days supplied to off-farm labor markets. 
    is a vector of institutional variables including the share of households in the village who received land 
certificates and whether or not a household experienced land reallocations.     is a vector including 
household demographics, asset value, and land endowment.     and    are year and province dummies.  
A drawback of the linear model for discrete responses is that partial effects are constant throughout the 
range of dependent variables and that negative fitted values and inconsistent conditional variance. In the 
case of farm exit, where the independent variable is binary, a probit model can be used to avoid this 
shortcoming.  By  the  same  token,  we  use  the  Poisson  model  for  the  number  of  household  members 
participating in off-farm labor markets which is a count variable. A tobit model is used to deal with the 
fact that the optimum amount of days supplied by a household to the off-farm labor market may be zero.  
In panel data settings, the independence between covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity is a strong 
assumption. Compared to probit and tobit models, the fixed-effect Poisson estimation is well-defined 
(Hausman et al. 1984, Wooldridge 1999). However, it does not allow an observation to contribute to the 
estimation if its outcomes are zeros in all periods, which will reduce our sample size by 8.8%, 39.9% and 
27.1% in terms of total number of individuals engaging in off-farm employment, migrants, and local off-
farm  participants,  respectively.  We  follow  recent  studies  and  include  average  levels  of  time-varying 
variables (Egger et al. 2011, Lewis et al. 2011, Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011), thus relaxing the independence 
assumption by modeling the distribution of the unobserved effect conditional on exogenous variables 
(Mundlak  1978,  Chamberlain  1984). The  GEE  and  the  pooled  tobit  (Wooldridge  2006)  allow  us  to 
enhance efficiency without sacrificing consistency. Based on our discussion, we expect reallocations to 
reduce exit from agriculture and certificates to enhance temporary labor supply to non-agriculture. 
To assess whether institutional arrangements can, either directly or indirectly, affect productivity, we start 
with a Cobb-Douglas production function 
                               
       
       
      
   (2) 
where      is the value of crops produced by household i in province j in year t;     ,     ,     , and      
are cultivated area, labor for production, value of agricultural assets, and a vector of inputs including 
seeds, chemical fertilizer, and others (the sum of organic manure, pesticides, and agricultural machinery);   13 
  ,   ,    and    are technical coefficients to be estimated;    and    are time invariant household and 
village characteristics;  Sit is again is the vector of institution variables including whether a household had 
a land use certificate or experienced a land reallocation. Taking logarithms on both sides yields 
                                                                  (3) 
where      ,      ,      ,        and        are  logarithms  of      ,      ,      ,        and      .  To  eliminate 
unobservable time invariant characteristics, we take first differences to obtain   
                                                        (4) 
In addition to technical coefficients θ regarding the impact of inputs, δ is the vector of key parameters of 
interest capturing the impact of having received land certificates or been affected by land reallocation in 
2000-2008.  Based  on  the  literature  discussed  earlier,  we  expect  certificates  to  affect  productivity 
positively while land reallocations are likely to have a negative impact. To interpret the coefficients on 
these coefficients as indicators of impact and thus attribute productivity changes to institutional changes is 
that both initial conditions and pre-intervention trends do not differ significantly between those who did 
and did not receive certificates or were affected by redistribution and we include relevant tests below.  
4. Econometric results  
Econometric analysis allows us to assess the relevance of institutional variables and the magnitude of 
their impact on relevant outcomes. Having been affected by reallocation reduces the propensity of exiting 
agriculture by a modest amount but leaves the amount of time supplied to the non-agricultural sector 
(migration or local) on a part-time basis unaffected. Coverage with certificates, on the other hand, reduces 
the likelihood of migration, but not of taking up local off-farm work. While some of these findings mirror 
qualitative results in other studies, the ability to explore productivity impacts of institutional arrangements 
sets ours apart. Doing so suggests that in both cases effects are large with absence of reallocation and 
presence of certificates increasing productivity by almost a third each, largely via allocative efficiency 
rather than land-attached investment. As development is likely to prompt further exogenous changes that 
provide opportunities for decentralized and market-based responses by local producers, attention to the 
institutional arrangements identified here may help to realize even greater productivity gains in the future.  
4.1 Non-agricultural labor supply and exit from the sector  
Coefficients in table 4 are average partial effects for the probability of exiting agriculture, the number of 
individuals participating in non-agricultural activities (both migration and local off-farm employment), 
and the number of days supplied to the different types of non-agricultural labor markets. We use the share   14 
of certificates at the village level because this is likely to determine demand for land transactions and as 
information on possession of certificates in 2008 was not collected for those who had exited agriculture.  
Regarding a permanent movement of labor from the sector, whether for local employment or migration, 
households who had been affected by land reallocations are less likely to exit the agricultural sector. The 
estimated marginal effect is about 5%, i.e. households who experienced reallocation after 2000 are 5% 
less likely to exit agriculture than those who did not, suggesting that legal restrictions on reallocation may 
be less than perfectly enforced.
16 To our knowledge, this is the first time that risk of reallocation has been 
shown to affect movement out of agriculture and it will be of interest to explore  associated productivity 
effects.  Part-time labor supply to non -agricultural labor markets is estimated to be unaffected by 
reallocation as, with one exception (number of individuals in local markets), all coefficients are negative 
but insignificantly different from zero. Reallocations thus appear to affect farmers‟ decisions on staying in 
agricultural production rather than the extent to which they engage in off-farm activities. Also, the share 
of certificates at village level, as a proxy for the transaction cost of land transfers, appears to not affect 
exist decisions and few of the other coefficients are of high significance.  
A second finding of interest is that availability of certificates significantly contributes to participation in 
off-farm labor markets, an effect driven entirely by the impact of certificates on encouraging migration. 
This is in line with the notion that, engaging in local off-farm employment is unlikely to significantly 
affect landlords‟  ability to monitor or enforce contracts but that absence for more extended periods of 
time will imply that there are benefits from more formal means of contracting. The size of estimated 
coefficients is large, compared to a village with no land certificates, issuance of land use certificates to 
every household in the village would be predicted to result in a 63% increase in the number of individuals 
supplying labor to non-agricultural labor markets or an increase of households‟ labor supply to such 
markets by 86 days. Specifically, it would increase the number of migrants by 36% and the working days 
they work by 99. The size of this effect is particularly remarkable given that data collection for the second 
round happened at the height of the financial crisis. Concerning other variables, higher levels of education 
emerge  as  being  positively  correlated  with  higher  levels  of  off-farm  participation.  On  average  each 
additional year of education translated to 3% increase in the number of individuals supplying labor to the 
non-farm sector (or a 2% increase in migrants) as well as 9 total off-farm labor (and 7 migration) days. 
In addition to the institutional variables of primary interest, we note that off-farm participation increases 
significantly over time and in endowments with physical and human capital as well as lower dependency 
rates. The positive and highly significant time dummy captures a secular increase in the propensity of 
                                                           
16 This result is in line with descriptive evidence suggesting that households who had experienced land reallocation in the past had a significantly 
higher subjective probability of losing land through reallocation in the future. They were more likely to expect a reallocation in the future and 
expected it to happen much sooner than those who had not suffered from a reallocation.    15 
exiting agriculture; the probability of exiting agricultural production in 2008 is estimated to be higher by 
an average of 13% as compared to in 2000. The positive coefficients on the size of population 14-60 years 
of age across all measures of off-farm participation point to the importance of the labor endowment for 
off-farm labor supply. At the mean, having one more adult in the household increased the number of 
individuals with off-farm pursuits by 48% and the number of labor days by 122. While the number of 
individuals in local off-farm work increased by 20%, that of migrants rose by 30% with increases of 56 
and  57  labor  days,  respectively.  Higher  numbers  of  dependents,  however,  reduce  the  propensity  to 
migrate but increase the likelihood of engaging in local off-farm labor markets, an effect that is even 
stronger for over 60 year olds. Although this may be partly due to the timing of the survey, it may also 
indicate that the latter can support farming in some periods but not take full management responsibility.  
The fact that assets are predicted to reduce the likelihood of migration while increasing the propensity to 
engage in off-farm employment is in line with the notion that lack of assets or local demand for labor is a 
key reason for households to migrate rather than participate in local off-farm employment. From a policy 
perspective, this reinforces the importance of policies favoring local asset accumulation.
17 The increases 
in real asset values reported in table 3 (Y 46,324 for the entire sample, from Y 20,278 in Hebei to 146,153 
in Zhejiang) would, according to the estimates, have led to a decrease in the number of individuals 
migrating by 4.6 percentage points on average,  ranging from 2.0 in Hebei to 14.6 in Zhejiang.  The 
significant positive coefficient on the 2008 year dummy for migration points towards an increase in off-
farm participation over time. The lack of a corresponding trend in local non-agricultural employment may 
indicate that the contribution to local economic growth rather than just out-migration is not yet assured. 
Differences in signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on province dummies also point towards  marked 
inter-regional variation in the extent of changes in non-agricultural labor market participation over time; 
moves into off-farm occupations are more likely in Zhejiang whereas local off -farm employment is less 
likely in Shaanxi, Liaoning, Sichuan and Hubei.  
4.2 Determinants of agricultural productivity  
If certificates and reallocations systematically affect households‟ participation in non-agricultural labor 
markets, one would expect them to also have an impact on the productivity of land use. In line with 
earlier  discussion,  three  possible  mechanisms  are  possible.  First,  greater  transferability  may  allow 
productive  farmers  to  lease  in  land  and  increase  the  size  of  their  operation.  Second  access  to  non-
agricultural income could, either directly or indirectly alleviate liquidity constraints that might have led to 
lower levels of productivity. Finally, increased tenure security and possibly long-term contracts could 
                                                           
17 The fact that remittances from migration were found to have increased spending on housing and consumer durables but not productive 
investment (de Brauw and Rozelle 2008) may point towards a need of exploring this issue more carefully.   16 
prompt those involved to make longer-term investments which may not necessarily be observable in the 
survey (e.g. if those remaining in agriculture invest to improve their agricultural skills to be able to farm 
greater land sizes more efficiently). Results from estimating a production function on the panel of 863 
full- or part-time farmers in table 5 provide a direct test of this and allow us to explore the plausibility of 
different channels through which such effects could materialize.  
As household fixed effects control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics only, effects estimated in 
this way can be interpreted as causal impact of institutional change in the 2000-08 period only if, before 
the intervention, those who were and were not affected by the change were on similar growth trajectories. 
While testing this „parallel trends‟ assumption requires panel data, we use the fact that individual-level 
job histories for the last decade and beyond were obtained from a subset of the households in the 2000 
survey to obtain information on changes in households‟ overall level of labor force participation, the share 
of households participating in full and part time agriculture, and the share of total labor time spent in 
migration  and  outside  of  agriculture.  Appendix  table  1  which  presents  levels  and  changes  in  these 
variables for the groups of interest does not allow us to reject the hypothesis of no significant difference 
in pre-intervention trends for any of the variables. To explore this further, we also check equality in key 
variables pertaining to household characteristics, labor supply, and endowments with productive factors 
such as land and assets. Appendix table 2 points towards significant differences in few of these variables 
only for households affected by reallocations who were more educated and affluent than those who were 
not. Under the assumption that education and wealth allow more rapid adoption of technical change, this 
should bias coefficients in the productivity regression downwards so that our estimate will be a lower 
bound of redistribution-induced productivity effects.  
We find evidence of a negative and significant impact of reallocations conducted after 2000 but not ones 
before this date.
18 The point estimate of 0.30 in both specifications suggests that, by reducing productivity 
by almost a third, redistributions could have had large productivity-effects. Further research is needed to 
determine whether this occurs because  operators without comparative advantage in farming  to stay in 
agriculture as they fear to lose to reallocation or whether it prevents efficiency-enhancing investments by 
tenants who are able to obtain land only for a short duration of time.  
While qualitative effects of reallocation on various determinants of productivity have been found -though 
not always quantified- before, our regressions also point towards possession of certificates having clear 
and quantitatively large productivity-effects. The magnitude of the coefficients, 0.32 for certificates that 
had been held before 2000 and 0.30 for those received between 2000 and 2008, suggests that households 
                                                           
18 Although this could be interpreted as suggesting only a short-lived impact of reallocations, a more plausible interpretation for the lack of pre-
2000 reallocations is that that many villages had some form of redistribution when original land use contracts expired in the 1990s.   17 
with a certificate are about one third more productive than those without a certificate.
19 If this effect were 
to come via higher levels of investment, we  would expect it to increase in  the length for which the 
certificate has been held.  Results for the relevant test, reported in the bottom panel, do  not allow us to 
reject equality of the  relevant coefficients  between  households  that  received  them earlier and later, 
implying that, rather than through investment, a large part of the effects measured here may be driven by 
differences in unobserved farmer ability and allocative efficiency.  
Coefficients on other factors such as land, fertilizer, and other purchased inputs are highly significant and 
with the large point estimate of the coefficient on land reinforcing the relevance of this factor.  The 
insignificant coefficient of labor, while consistent with findings from other studies (Benjamin et al. 2005) 
is surprising in view of recent concerns about emerging labor shortages in China‟s export sector but may 
be explained by the notion that it is the old who take care of agricultural cultivation in many contexts, 
especially if there is significant out-migration (Chang et al. 2011).  
5. Conclusion and policy implications  
The fact that productivity growth in non-agriculture has consistently been higher than in the agricultural 
sector implies a secular movement of labor out of agriculture with economic development. The nature and 
speed of this process, and the implications for household welfare as well as policies to address rural-urban 
income gaps, will depend on the policy and institutional environment. The issue is acute in China given 
the  spatial  concentration  of  industry,  the  small  size  of  average  agricultural  land  endowments,  large 
numbers of farmers and the generational dynamics created by rapid ageing of rural populations. All of 
these suggest an enormous potential for market-based transfers to improve allocative efficiency and rural 
economic  development  in  the  near  future.  Better  appreciation  of  how  institutional  factors  affect  the 
direction and pace of rural structural transformation and productivity will be critical to understand the 
underlying dynamics and help design policies that can avoid rising rural-urban inequality without having 
to resort to very costly and potentially distorting transfer payments. However, even though China is at a 
critical point in terms of policy design, empirical studies in this area are lacking.  
To help close this gap, we use recent panel data to study the impact of two key institutional factors -land 
reallocation through non-market mechanisms and availability of land use certificates- on rural structural 
transformation and agricultural productivity. Based on the notion of tenure security and transferability as 
main ways through which land tenure affects behavior, we hypothesize that reallocations may impede a 
smooth exit from agriculture whereas certificates could make it easier to transfer land and leave the 
current residence to join the non-agricultural labor force on a temporary basis. While the impacts of 
                                                           
19 Note that, because the regression includes only those who reported agricultural production in both periods, we are able to use the possession of 
land certificate at the household level as the relevant variable.    18 
institutional arrangements on labor market participation have been explored by previous studies, we are 
able to go beyond the existing literature by quantifying productivity implications.  
Three empirical results stand out. First, experience of reallocations after 2000 reduces incentives for 
permanently exiting agriculture (but not temporary non-agricultural labor supply). With 5%, the size of 
the estimated effect remains modest. Second, certificates seem to affect participation in non-agricultural 
labor markets almost entirely through their impact on enhancing temporary migration. In this case, the 
estimated  coefficients  are  large;  having  certificates  for  all  households  in  village  would  increase  an 
average household‟s supply of labor to the off-farm sector by half a person. Third, although we find little 
evidence of investment impacts from higher levels of tenure security, it appears that institutional variables 
affect allocative efficiency. Having been affected by reallocation after 2000 is estimated to have reduced 
productivity by about 30%. Receipt of a land use certificate during this period had a quantitatively large 
impact on productivity of about the same magnitude.  
There are two areas for follow-up research. First, it will be of interest to explore channels for institutional 
arrangements to affect outcomes in more detail, complementing the reduced form approach taken here 
although data requirements of this are likely to be large. Second, land and labor are undeniably linked and 
it is generally believed that labor market distortions have a much more significant impact on economic 
outcomes than those in land markets. Some of the recent land reform pilots also involved loosening of 
residency requirements and would thus allow study of the interaction between the two markets. In light of 
the magnitude of productivity-effects from land market restrictions only estimated here, such analysis 
would appear both timely and policy relevant. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by type of employment 
                  Total  Full time farmers  Part time farmers  Non-farmers 
  2000  2008  2000  2008  2000  2008  2000  2008 
Household demographics                 
Head‟s age   45.06  52.58  46.99  57.79  44.38  51.39  46.83  51.82 
Male head   0.97  0.95  0.97  0.92  0.97  0.96  0.98  0.91 
Household size  4.06  3.74  3.55  2.75  4.23  4.06  3.70  3.58 
Population <14 years  0.72  0.42  0.75  0.30  0.71  0.49  0.75  0.30 
Population 14-60 years  3.00  2.83  2.30  1.53  3.24  3.18  2.53  2.84 
Population >60 years  0.34  0.49  0.50  0.92  0.28  0.39  0.42  0.44 
Dependency ratio   0.26  0.26  35.69  50.11  22.30  20.17  36.44  25.49 
Head‟s education (year)  6.61  6.54  5.77  5.46  6.82  6.75  7.00  6.86 
Highest education (year)  9.60  9.89  7.52  7.26  10.19  10.52  9.47  10.19 
Labor supply & income sources                 
Total labor supply (days)  508  622  288  273  578  738  413  545 
Days worked per adult  170  224  125  158  182  241  168  205 
 from agriculture (%)  51.1  40.2  100.0  100.0  41.4  35.5  0.0  0.0 
 from migration (%)  16.5  30.4  0.0  0.0  20.8  31.3  22.5  60.0 
 from local off-farm (%)  32.4  29.4  0.0  0.0  37.8  33.2  77.5  40.0 
Income per adult eq.  2518  5670  892  3015  2854  6123  4047  6595 
Gini of income per adult eq.  0.53  0.50  0.45  0.55  0.48  0.43  0.56  0.56 
Total income (yuan)  8940  19295  2498  6223  10356  21845  13929  22737 
 from agriculture (%)  46.8  37.5  100.0  100.0  35.6  31.3  0.0  0.0 
 from migration (%)  19.1  34.1  0.0  0.0  24.4  36.2  17.0  62.4 
 from local off-farm (%)  34.1  28.4  0.0  0.0  40.0  32.5  83.0  37.6 
Income per day worked (yuan)  25.00  43.49  14.95  47.61  25.73  37.01  57.43  65.47 
Number of off-farm individuals   1.36  1.62  0.00  0.00  1.72  1.81  1.59  2.49 
Share of off-farm individuals  0.43  0.52  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.52  1.00  1.00 
Number of migrants  0.44  0.84  0.00  0.00  0.56  0.81  0.38  1.70 
Share of migrants  0.14  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.23  0.24  0.68 
Number of local off-farm individuals   0.92  0.78  0.00  0.00  1.16  0.99  1.22  0.79 
Share of local off-farm individuals   0.29  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.34  0.28  0.77  0.32 
Productive activity                 
Owned land area (mu)  7.70  6.52  9.07  6.94  7.69  7.01  3.00  4.35 
Gini of owned land area  0.46  0.43  0.48  0.46  0.44  0.42  0.44  0.43 
Cultivated land area (mu)  8.05  7.23  9.68  8.83  8.23  8.87  0.00  0.00 
Gini of asset  0.64  0.72   0.59  0.68  0.62  0.62  0.72  0.80 
Assets (yuan)  32,491  105,310  16,863  53,445  33,432  84,355  75,880  226,816 
 of which agricultural (%)  9.02  5.47  13.71  9.12  8.36  5.90  0.70  0.35 
Geographical distribution                 
Hebei (%)  16.6  16.6  22.7  21.6  71.3  62.4  6.1  16.0 
Shaanxi (%)  17.0  17.0  16.7  16.7  80.7  71.0  2.7  12.4 
Liaoning (%)  16.9  16.9  32.4  29.7  64.3  59.5  3.2  10.8 
Zhejiang (%)  17.9  17.9  10.2  11.8  79.6  54.1  10.2  34.2 
Sichuan (%)  14.1  14.1  28.6  17.5  66.2  67.5  5.2  14.9 
Hubei (%)  17.5  17.5  15.7  7.9  77.0  71.2  7.3  20.9 
No. of observations  1093  1093  226  190  803  701  64  202 
Source: Own computation from 2000/2010 panel household survey.  
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Table 2: Incidence of land reallocations institutional preconditions for tenure security and land market development 
  Total  Hebei  Shaanxi  Liaoning  Zhejiang  Sichuan  Hubei 
Land reallocations (household level)               
Never had reallocation (%)  70.17  74.03  68.82  67.57  60.71  84.42  68.59 
Reallocation before 2000 (%)  17.02  23.20  18.28  15.14  20.92  7.79  15.18 
Reallocation after 2000 (%)  9.61  2.21  7.53  14.59  14.29  7.14  10.99 
Realloc. in both periods (%)  3.20  0.55  5.38  2.70  4.08  0.65  5.24 
Land reallocations (village level)               
Share with major reallocations before 2000  0.58  1.00  0.21  1.00  0.90  0.12  0.19 
Share with minor reallocations before 2000  0.67  0.39  0.90  0.61  0.80  0.62  0.70 
Share with major reallocations after 2000  0.14  0.00  0.29  0.11  0.30  0.00  0.09 
Share with minor reallocations after 2000  0.20  0.28  0.38  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.09 
Land use certificates               
No land certificate (%)  31.93  30.94  39.78  29.73  28.57  27.92  34.03 
Certificate before 2000 (%)  31.75  45.30  29.57  43.78  35.71  26.62  9.42 
Certificate after 2000 (%)  16.10  2.21  6.99  18.92  10.20  18.83  39.27 
Certificate, date unknown (%)  20.22  21.55  23.66  7.57  25.51  26.62  17.28   
No. of observations  1,093  181  186  185  196  154  191 
Source: Own computation from 2000/2010 panel household survey.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for agricultural production 
  Total  Hebei  Shaanxi  Liaoning  Zhejiang  Sichuan  Hubei 
  2000 
Output (yuan)  2550.05  3658.54  2366.68  3269.12  2142.68  1781.75  1848.72 
Yield (yuan/mu)  368.97  373.03  352.663  287.50  409.17  430.13  386.45 
Profit & return to labor (Y/mu)  196.44  197.64  206.69  101.60  211.21  275.75  208.61 
Owned land area (mu)  8.47  13.69  7.94  11.73  5.24  4.76  6.11 
Cultivated land area (mu)  9.12  14.77  8.09  12.62  6.85  4.88  6.25 
Total labor (manday/mu)  47.03  28.81  48.07  24.07  32.44  81.94  71.68 
Family labor (manday/mu)  46.77  28.77  47.75  23.58  32.02  81.87  71.51 
Hired labor (manday/mu)  0.26  0.03  0.32  0.48  0.42  0.07  0.17 
Seed exp. (yuan/mu)  20.70  13.42  16.70  33.80  18.79  17.69  21.94 
Fertilizer exp. (yuan/mu)  77.29  75.01  66.26  59.61  78.36  94.43  95.41 
Other expenditure (yuan/mu)  69.57  86.36  59.08  83.68  88.17  41.11  57.46 
Head‟s age   45.02  45.00  45.39  45.58  47.62  42.43  44.05 
Male head   0.98  0.98  0.94  0.99  0.98  0.97  0.99 
Household size  4.13  4.12  4.35  3.64  4.14  4.27  4.30 
Population 14-60 years  3.09  3.14  3.16  2.76  3.34  3.05  3.19 
Highest education (year)  9.58  9.03  10.08  10.23  10.26  8.10  9.60 
Agricultural assets (yuan)  1,084  2,043  796  1,419  618  760  737 
Non-agricultural assets (yuan)  25,119  24,812  14,400  27,010  52,977  9,534  25,002 
Household w certificate (%)  33.60  47.26  31.65   45.40  34.96  29.92  10.96 
Household date unknown (%)  14.95  17.81  16.46   3.68  21.95  25.20   8.22 
Experienced reallocations (%)  19.58  23.97  22.15  19.02  25.20  8.66  17.81 
  2008 
Output (yuan)  5588.29  8115.37  4427.23  8501.52  5061.67  3168.09  3614.18 
Yield (yuan/mu)  775.04  828.79  688.02  787.32  1030.54  661.58  685.17 
Profit & return to labor (Y/mu)  456.27  502.10  403.30  485.15  694.48  334.95  340.36 
Owned land area (mu)  7.06  10.86  5.81  10.21  3.98  4.94  5.51 
Cultivated land area (mu)  8.98  12.59  6.44  14.78  7.05  5.20  6.60 
Total labor (manday/mu)  53.19  33.13  62.01  32.16  28.12  113.54  55.84 
Family labor (manday/mu)  52.73  32.79  61.81  31.94  26.90  112.59  55.72 
Hired labor (manday/mu)  0.47  0.34  0.19  0.22  1.22  0.95  0.12 
Seed exp. (yuan/mu)  33.28  31.74  25.48  43.16  19.84  33.58  43.27 
Fertilizer exp. (yuan/mu)  142.93  137.34  141.35  122.87  115.49  175.78  167.15 
Other expenditure (yuan/mu)  120.41  145.34  107.73  124.58  120.37  96.52  125.33 
Head‟s age   52.59  51.97  52.92  53.65  55.26  49.69  51.94 
Male head   0.95  0.96  0.92  0.98  0.98  0.94  0.95 
Household size  3.79  3.66  3.98  3.34  3.77  3.98  4.07 
Population 14-60 years  2.84  2.80  3.01  2.46  2.83  2.91  3.03 
Highest education (year)  9.84  9.21  10.22  10.01  10.24  9.00  10.29 
Agricultural assets (yuan)  1,845  2,815  2,122  2,704  598  998  1,401 
Non-agricultural assets (yuan)  70,683  44,319  40,718  58,072  199,150  39,138  62,763 
Household w certificate (%)  66.86  67.81  56.33  69.94  69.92  72.44    66.44 
Experienced reallocations (%)  12.98   2.74  13.92  19.02  14.63  8.66  17.81 
No. of observations  863  146  158  163  123  127  146 
Source: Own computation from 2000/2010 panel household survey.  
Note: Monetary values for 2008 are deflated by CPIs from NBSC. 
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Table 4: Regressions for households moving off the farm and the labor supplied to off-farm activities 
  Exit from  No. of individuals employed in   Days worked in 
    agriculture  off farm  ..migrating  …local  off farm   ..migrating   …local 
Own land area per capita  -0.002  0.002  -0.013  0.020  2.000   -3.578   3.896  
(0.014)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (4.034)   (3.378)   (3.466)  
Head‟s age   -0.002  -0.019**  -0.011  -0.008  -3.871**   -1.549   -2.601  
(0.002)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (1.817)   (1.806)   (1.495)  
Male head  0.026  0.066  0.163  -0.210  -34.696   -6.035   -50.548  
(0.067)  (0.174)  (0.157)  (0.135)  (52.024)   (41.018)   (36.102)  
Highest education   -0.003  0.030***  0.023***  0.008  9.168***   7.192***   3.774**  
(0.003)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (2.486)   (2.046)   (1.925)  
Population <14 years  -0.030**  -0.057  -0.109***  0.066**  6.005   -31.676***   25.687***  
(0.013)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (11.129)   (8.896)   (8.849)  
Population 14-60 years  -0.003  0.481***  0.304***  0.199***  122.050***   57.006***   55.826***  
(0.010)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (9.581)   (7.301)   (7.930)  
Population >60 years  -0.005  0.113*  0.055  0.071  43.073**   7.100   32.510**  
(0.022)  (0.063)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (17.187)   (12.407)   (14.420)  
Value of assets („000 yuan)  0.000  -0.000  -0.001***  0.000***  -0.037   -0.214***   0.063*  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.037)   (0.065)   (0.035)  
Share of certificates 
(village level) 
-0.011  0.631***  0.356**  0.143  85.768*   98.967***   -7.897  
(0.053)  (0.151)  (0.139)  (0.158)  (45.823)   (36.925)   (41.625)  
Land reallocation   -0.049**  -0.026  -0.061  0.016  -14.385   -2.641   -8.932  
(0.019)  (0.075)  (0.062)  (0.067)  (21.040)   (17.183)   (17.034)  
Year 2008  0.132***  0.295***  0.449***  -0.106  126.195***   82.731***   23.120 
(0.035)  (0.082)  (0.101)  (0.076)  (19.737)   (19.290)   (16.285)  
Shaanxi  -0.033  -0.031  0.626***  -0.419***  10.926   119.372***   -119.33***  
  (0.021)  (0.077)  (0.134)  (0.048)  (20.883)   (17.705)   (18.919)  
Liaoning  -0.040*  -0.128  0.168  -0.192***  27.900   31.446   -12.861 
  (0.021)  (0.082)  (0.111)  (0.060)  (22.829)   (19.215)   (19.493)  
Zhejiang  0.027  0.336***  0.481***  0.060  115.238***   75.447***   37.937*  
  (0.032)  (0.091)  (0.138)  (0.068)  (23.416)   (19.781)   (19.694)  
Sichuan  -0.026  -0.205***  0.489***  -0.454***  -8.917   107.934***   -116.80***  
  (0.024)  (0.077)  (0.135)  (0.048)  (22.337)   (18.434)   (20.905)  
Hubei  0.039  0.258***  0.652***  -0.193***  86.594***   120.930***   -38.292*  
  (0.031)  (0.089)  (0.142)  (0.062)  (22.198)   (18.872)   (20.172)  
Observations  2,186  2,186  2,186  2,186       
Wald chi
2  227.31  1373.52  809.35  522.17       
Pseudo R
2          0.037  0.039   
R
2  0.128  0.405  0.306  0.203  0.339  0.218  0.204 
Note: R
2 is calculated based on the correlation coefficient between predicted and observed values (see Egger et al. 2011). 
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Table 5: Determinants of agricultural productivity     
  Output (log) 
Cultivated land area (log)  0.708***  0.679*** 
(0.118)  (0.115) 
Total labor (log)  -0.043   
(0.047)   
Family labor (log)    -0.028 
  (0.046) 
Hired labor (log)    0.013 
  (0.099) 
Highest education (log)  0.043  0.015 
(0.130)  (0.129) 
Value of agricultural assets (log)  0.025  0.022 
(0.020)  (0.020) 
Expenditure on seeds (log)  0.038  0.036 
(0.041)  (0.041) 
Expenditure on fertilizer (log)  0.158**  0.144** 
(0.061)  (0.061) 
Other expenditure (log)  0.157***  0.158*** 
(0.050)  (0.048) 
Land certificates before 2000 (  )  0.315***  0.333*** 
(0.103)  (0.102) 
Land certificates after 2000 (  )  0.295**  0.272* 
(0.148)  (0.139) 
Land reallocations before 2000 (  )  -0.052  -0.021 
(0.105)  (0.110) 
Land reallocations after 2000 (  )  -0.304**  -0.298** 
(0.127)  (0.128) 
Shaanxi  -0.297**  -0.296* 
(0.143)  (0.151) 
Liaoning  -0.100  -0.101 
(0.159)  (0.171) 
Zhejiang  -0.421***  -0.465*** 
(0.160)  (0.164) 
Sichuan  -0.789***  -0.841*** 
(0.144)  (0.148) 
Hubei  -0.250  -0.232 
(0.164)  (0.169) 
Constant  0.637***  0.635*** 
(0.116)  (0.118) 
Observation  863  863 
R
2  0.378  0.386 
Tests:      
         0.02  0.18 
             3.83*  3.03*   24 
Appendix table 1: Test for parallel trends between 1990/95 and 2000 
 
Total  Received certificates in 2000-08  Affected by reallocations 2000-08 
   
No  Yes  t-test  No  Yes  t-test 
Levels in 2000 
             
No. of working individuals   3.78  3.81  3.65 
 
3.79  3.72 
 
Share in agric. full time   0.48  0.47  0.51 
 
0.48  0.42 
 
Share in agric. part time   0.28  0.28  0.28 
 
0.28  0.29 
 
Share of migrants  0.14  0.14  0.14 
 
0.13  0.17 
 
Share outside of agriculture   0.25  0.25  0.21 
 
0.24  0.29 
 
Changes between 1990 and 2000 
           
No. of working individuals   0.90  0.94  0.74 
 
0.89  0.97 
 
Share in agric. full time   -0.23  -0.24  -0.20 
 
-0.24  -0.19 
 
Share in agric. part time   0.09  0.10  0.06 
 
0.10  0.03 
 
Share of migrants  0.10  0.10  0.11 
 
0.09  0.11 
 
Share outside of agriculture   0.14  0.14  0.14 
 
0.14  0.15 
 
Growth rates between 1990 and 2000 
           
No. of working individuals   0.03  0.03  0.02 
 
0.03  0.03 
 
Share in agric. full time   -0.21  -0.24  -0.10 
 
-0.22  -0.20 
 
Share in agric. part time   0.66  0.66  0.64 
 
0.68  0.50 
 
Share of migrants  0.83  0.84  0.77 
 
0.83  0.77 
 
Share outside of agriculture   0.95  0.94  1.00 
 
0.96  0.84 
 
Changes between 1995 and 2000 
           
No. of working individuals   0.49  0.51  0.40 
 
0.47  0.61 
 
Share in agric. full time   -0.14  -0.15  -0.12 
 
-0.15  -0.13 
 
Share in agric. part time   0.06  0.05  0.07 
 
0.06  0.03 
 
Share of migrants  0.06  0.06  0.07 
 
0.06  0.07 
 
Share outside of agriculture   0.09  0.10  0.05 
 
0.09  0.10 
 
Growth rates between 1995 and 2000 
             
No. of working individuals   0.03  0.03  0.03 
 
0.03  0.04 
 
Share in agric. full time   -0.38  -0.42  -0.18 
 
-0.35  -0.54 
 
Share in agric. part time   0.83  0.81  0.88 
 
0.86  0.57 
 
Share of migrants  1.13  1.14  1.08 
 
1.15  1.02 
 
Share outside of agriculture   1.31  1.35  1.12 
 
1.31  1.29 
 
No. of observations  517  431  86 
 
450  67 
 
Source: Own computation from 2000/2010 panel household survey.  
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Appendix table 2: Comparison of initial conditions for households receiving certificates/affected by redistribution in 2000-08 
 
Total  Received certificates in 2000-08  Affected by reallocations 2000-08 
   
No  Yes  t-test  No  Yes  t-test 
Household demographics               
Male head   0.98  0.97  0.99 
 
0.97  0.99 
 
Household size  4.12  4.12  4.13 
 
4.11  4.21 
 
Population <14 years  0.71  0.70  0.73 
 
0.71  0.69 
 
Population 14-60 years  3.09  3.11  3.04 
 
3.08  3.21 
 
Population >60 years  0.33  0.32  0.35 
 
0.33  0.31 
 
Dependency ratio   0.24  0.24  0.26 
 
0.25  0.22 
 
Highest education (year)  9.58  9.52  9.89 
 
9.47  10.35  ** 
Labor supply & income sources               
Total labor supply (days)  526  530  506 
 
523  545 
 
Days worked per adult  170  171  169 
 
171  168 
 
... in agriculture (%)  56.2  56.1  56.4 
 
56.7  52.6 
 
... in migration (%)  16.4  16.2  17.2 
 
16.0  18.6 
 
... in local off-farm (%)  27.5  27.7  26.4 
 
27.3  28.8 
 
Income per adult eq.  2,080  2,078  2,091 
 
2,006  2,578  *** 
Total income (yuan)  7,581  7,606  7,471 
 
7,263  9,714  *** 
… from agriculture (%)  51.4  52.2  47.8 
 
51.6  50.4 
 
… from migration (%)  19.4  18.8  21.7 
 
19.1  20.9 
 
… from local off-farm (%)  29.2  28.9  30.5 
 
29.3  28.7 
 
Number of off-farm individuals   1.34  1.34  1.32 
 
1.32  1.44 
 
Share of off-farm individuals  0.39  0.39  0.39 
 
0.38  0.41 
 
Number of migrants  0.46  0.45  0.49 
 
0.44  0.54 
 
Share of migrants  0.12  0.12  0.13 
 
0.12  0.13 
 
Number of individuals in local off-farm  0.88  0.90  0.82 
 
0.88  0.90 
 
Share of individuals in local off-farm  0.27  0.27  0.26 
 
0.26  0.28 
 
Endowments and productive activity               
Owned land area (mu)  8.46  8.63  7.71 
 
8.51  8.13 
 
Cultivated land area (mu)  9.12  9.34  8.13 
 
9.22  8.43 
 
Assets (yuan)  26,203  26,823  23,435 
 
24,536  37,379  *** 
… of which agricultural (%)  0.10  0.10  0.09 
 
0.10  0.09 
 
No. of observations  863  705  158 
 
751  112 
 
Source: Own computation from 2000/2010 panel household survey.  
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